Israel: Between A Rock And A Hard Place

Less than four short years ago, in August of 2005, Israel—in a historic and unprecedented act—withdrew from the contested land of Gaza.  This development ranked as one of the most significant changes in the landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1967.

Hamas, the largest Palestinian militant Islamist organization, went on to both win Gaza-wide legislative elections in 2006 and then prevailed over the secular nationalist Palestinian Authority in a contest of arms for the Gaza territory.  While Hamas dug in and tightened its control of Gaza, Israelis had not forgotten the organization’s role in conducting hundreds of suicide bombings in Israel in the 1990’s as well as dozens more suicide attacks against Israel from 2003 to 2006.  Israel continued to rely on the wall it erected between itself and the Palestinians of Gaza as a means of reducing the number of Israeli victims of Hamas-led suicide bombings. 

But Hamas then took another evolutionary step in terror: firing missiles out of Gaza’s population centers into towns in Southern Israel.  The Israelis have since had to adjust, and that adjustment has led to the situation as it stands today.  Now in its eleventh day of military operations in Gaza, Israel has found itself in the most difficult of positions. 

First, Hamas stores its weaponry in mosques, schools and hospitals—thereby inviting Israeli retaliation as a means of creating civilian casualties among its own population and further inciting anti-Israeli propaganda.  Second, commentators have grumbled that Israel should only seize those locations from which Hamas missiles are fired.  But what they fail to understand is that these missile systems are portable. Hamas employs “shoot-and-scoot” methodology— firing at a target and then immediately moving away from the location where the shots were fired.

Israel, fully cognizant of these tactics, has decided to engage Hamas facilities and personnel head on as a means of degrading the overall organization.  Although Israel is under no illusions as to its ability to snuff out Hamas in its entirety, it believes it can and must degrade Hamas leadership, combat and terror capability.

As a final thought, many are comparing the current Israeli-Palestinian crisis with Israel’s 2006 incursion into Southern Lebanon, which many critics called a failure.  Within this context, however, it is important to remember the words of Hizballah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who led the effort against Israel from Southern Lebanon.  Commenting after the conclusion of the conflict, Nasrallah made a significant statement: had he understood the full extent of Israel’s response in advance, he would never have approved the attack on the Israeli outpost that sparked that conflict.  Clearly, Israeli policy makers are now striving to make the same impression on the leadership of Hamas.