The Berntsen National Security Review

Afghanistan: Policing as a Counterinsurgency Strategy

Like many others, I watched both President Obama and former Vice President Cheney as they staked out their respective positions on counterterrorism on television two weeks ago.  The speeches made for good press, but had much less practical impact.  Meanwhile, thousands of American men and women in uniform are moving into the Afghan theater where a significant increase in combat and casualties is about to occur.  Not one word spoken during those speeches in Washington had any relevance to the many young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are preparing for the mission that lies ahead.  Both President Obama and former Vice President Cheney talked about Human Intelligence Operations, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in a manner that would indicate that they understand those subjects.  I submit that they are both, at best, only marginally aware of what is occurring on the ground and what needs to be done to advance our interests. 

Though I am more supportive of many of the positions made by Vice President Cheney, the reality is that the Bush administration’s record in Afghanistan was less than stellar in the end.  Its record included the following: a failure to close on Bin Laden in Tora Bora when the opportunity presented itself; the inexplicable opening of an air corridor in December 2001 allowing the Pakistani Air Force to fly into Afghanistan and extract Taliban commanders from Konduz; a failure to immediately implement a broad program of economic and social development following the cessation of violence in 2002; and finally a complete failure to understand, develop and implement a program of policing as a counterinsurgency tool.

In addition to my early deployments of 2000 and 2001 in Afghanistan, I spent from June 2007 to June 2008 in eastern Afghanistan.  Throughout that time, I was deeply disappointed by the failure of the U.S. government to employ policies and practices that addressed the challenges of an enemy that had penetrated deeply into the country and was transitioning to guerrilla and IED warfare.  While in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008, I conducted over forty-four meetings and presentations in an effort to get the United States military to employ counterinsurgency programs that would have greater relevance to the threat at hand.  I met with the U.S. Army brigade and division staffs to which I was assigned.  I also met with the appropriate Task Forces, the Combined Security and Transition Command (CTSC) and even the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  The levels of bureaucracy were horrifying and I found staff officers were averse to incurring any kind of risk.  Little change was implemented.  The result of all of this was an emboldened enemy and an extended conflict.   

Now for the other side.  It is difficult for me to believe that President Obama has made a commitment to exercising a strong and vibrant national defense.  His campaign for the presidency smacked of leftist populism and included a healthy amount of criticism of those of us who have actually fought terror.  Much support for him came from those who loathe the national security establishment.  During the 2008 presidential campaign, I worked as a Veterans Coordinator for Senator John McCain.  In a shopping center in Pennsylvania during the final days of the campaign, I—along with a seriously wounded veteran of the Iraqi conflict—chose to wear a “Veterans for McCain” t-shirt.  We received one verbal insult after another from Obama supporters in language that I care not to print.  I know passions run high in any election but what was said to us made clear that the service and sacrifice of our candidate or the service of any veteran meant little to many of Candidate Obama’s supporters.  I would never have believed the insults and hatred had I not experienced it first hand.

Undeterred from these experiences, I have since done a dozen meetings on Capital Hill, at the Pentagon and with senior Obama administration officials.  My aim again was to focus the administration on counterinsurgency strategies that will work in the Afghan theater of operations.  I was pleasantly surprised to see that many officials were at least willing to meet and listen, though they appear no more capable of implementing functional counterinsurgency practices than their predecessors.  Individuals in senior positions are waiting for orders from the very top.  Unfortunately, initiative seems to have been wrung out of those who inhabit the national security establishment regardless of political party or persuasion.  In counterinsurgency the simple adding of forces—as Obama plans to do this summer with the addition of 17,000 troops—does not make an effective program.  In the end, progress will be determined only by the growing participation and competency of sustainable Afghan counterinsurgency forces.

A successful model to date has been this: Afghan National Army battalions paired with U.S. Special Forces teams that supervise Afghan National Army training and then accompany them on combat operations.  These combined elements have become highly functional and lethal on the battlefield.  In contrast, the Afghan National Police (ANP) lack credible specialized units to work against militants and IED networks.  The creation of such units—with special pay, money for informant operations, basic technology, U.S. trainers and most importantly U.S. team leaders—would radically change the struggle across the country.  Properly trained U.S. civilian police need to be assigned to the Afghan National Police for the purpose of conducting operations from within the ANP chain of command.  Such inclusion of U.S. personnel in counterinsurgency-focused units would match U.S. leadership and resources with Afghan local linguistic and cultural knowledge.  It would make an enormous difference in an organization that lost well over 1,000 men last year.  Though this program alone will not win the war, it will provide a framework from within which other civilian programs can be established.

Assignment to the ANP would be challenging and dangerous for those who step forward. To date, civilian advisors conduct basic police training.  It is time to move beyond that.  I have heard a lot of criticism in the press about military contractors who are often labeled as mercenaries.  But a good number of those contractors serving as police trainers do so not because of the money.  They do so because their sons and daughters, nieces and nephews and neighbors are fighting in Afghanistan.  Of the six such advisors in my brigade from 2007 to 2008, four of us had a combined total of seven children serving in the military—all of them either in theater or on their way.    

The Obama administration can turn this conflict around more quickly, while spending less and limiting the deployment of additional combat forces.  But it will require the adoption of a refined counterinsurgency policing strategy.  The shameful and painful truth about Afghanistan is that a sizable number of American troops are dying needlessly.  As someone with much experience over several decades in Afghanistan and in counterterrorism, I am most disturbed by the total lack of urgency or good sense by our national security apparatus, in general, and within the Department of Defense, in particular, in addressing these losses.  And I am in no way comforted or reassured by speeches such as those given by President Obama and former Vice President Cheney.  Republicans and Democrats alike would do the nation a service by focusing not on what has happened in the past but rather participating in the development of a tailored strategy to win in Afghanistan today.

The Interrogation Memorandums

This past week President Obama authorized the release of a set of classified memorandums written during the Bush administration.  These documents outlined the procedures and tactics employed during the interrogations of captured senior Al Qaeda operatives and have been referred to by the press as the “torture memos”.  President Obama’s release of these memos took place despite substantial protest.  The four most recent CIA Directors—John Deutch, George Tenet, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden—all recommended against the release of these memorandums.  President Obama’s own newly appointed Director of CIA, Leon Panetta, also recommended against releasing the documents.  Yet President Obama, in a seemingly relentless effort to discredit his predecessor, George W. Bush, made the memorandum available to the public anyway.

In taking this action, President Obama has effectively defined the limits of what America, at its most aggressive and most passive, would do against Al Qaeda detainees.  This will undoubtedly allow groups like Al Qaeda to adjust the preparation and training of their operatives.  Administration officials as well as some journalists on the left have argued that the President took into consideration the fact that much of the memos’ contents have already made it into the press.  This is a hollow defense.  Speculation or discussion of these details in the press may allow Al Qaeda and other terrorists to assess potential U.S. capabilities to some extent.  But official White House memorandums released to the public, and immediately downloadable online, are the gold standard for Al Qaeda. 

In addition to bolstering Al Qaeda’s tactical position and morale, I argue that President Obama has also demoralized those members of the Clandestine Service that make enormous personal sacrifices and take tremendous risks in the fight to keep our nation safe.  After having served most of my adult life in CIA’s Clandestine Service and having led many important counterterrorism missions, I can say that the rank and file is truly horrified by President Obama’s naïve decision making.  Apologists for Obama’s misguided decision may counter by highlighting the President’s announcement that no CIA employees who participated in the interrogation program will be prosecuted.  Surely President Obama understood that taking such action would have accelerated retirement of many senior officers already eligible to depart and would have also caused a significant number of resignations.

On top of all this, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, called recently for a “truth and reconciliation commission”—much like what South Africa used to address decades of apartheid.  Leahy’s “truth commission” would purportedly be established to investigate allegations of wrongdoing at the Justice Department during the Bush Administration.  It would allow America to cleanse itself of what he terms Bush Administration crimes.  This is simply a cheap political stunt designed solely for Democratic political advantage and will further undermine our ability to defend ourselves against Al Qaeda terror.

On a daily basis we watch countries like Iran and North Korea continue to advance their technology in the area of weapons of mass destruction.  What the Obama administration fails to comprehend is that terrorist groups are also evolving their tradecraft and the lethality with which they plan to strike.  The fact that we did not suffer a significant follow-on attack in the continental United States during George W. Bush’s eight year presidency resulted from the extremely aggressive posture taken by his administration.  George W. Bush, for all his mistakes and missteps, did understand that we were at war with a lethal and insidious enemy, and he conducted himself accordingly.  Sadly, it is inevitable that a time will come when we learn of an impending catastrophic attack on an American city.  In today’s highly globalized society, small numbers of people can leverage technology to do terrible things.  Given the positions staked out by President Obama, how does a reasonable person believe the national security apparatus will function in such a crisis?  Will individuals be willing to accept the reality of such a threat and be allowed to act decisively at the lowest level to counter the threat, or will such threats have to work their way up the chain of command, at the cost of time, for reflection by President Obama himself?

President Obama’s handling of the classified Bush-era interrogation memorandums displays a lack of maturity.  More dangerously, it displays a lack of understanding of what could lie ahead for the nation.  Like all Presidents in the modern age, Obama is likely to face events in the years ahead that will be heartrending.  To prepare for these challenges and to minimize the impact on the nation, he must avoid rewarding our enemy and build consensus within the national security establishment.  Unfortunately, with the release of these memos, the hope that President Obama would conduct himself in foreign affairs as a moderate pragmatist has all but evaporated.  

      

A Tale of Two Wars

President Barack Obama's announcement of an August 2010 withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq—while simultaneously leaving 35,000 to 50,000 troops behind to conduct training of Iraqi forces and participate in counterterrorism missions—brought expected responses from both sides of the Congressional aisle. While Republicans responded with a "told-you-so" attitude, a sizable portion of the Democratic Party expressed considerable disappointment.  In fact, it appears a number of Democrats are so desperate to leave Iraq that they would retreat tomorrow if permitted—even if it meant that Al Qaeda was given keys to the Presidential Palace.  Without a doubt, a phased and responsible withdrawal from Iraq will provide a needed decrease in the operational tempo and increase the overall health and well being of our Armed Forces.  Everyone welcomes a drawdown.  But what many lawmakers fail to fully comprehend is that the enemy does get a vote in this process.  New waves of violence can change the facts on the ground and can alter the best of plans.

Fortunately, President Obama has decided upon taking a prudent approach that back loads the withdrawal to the later part of an 18 month plan and then maintains a sizable force to deal with potential problems.  The Status of Forces Agreement signed prior to the departure of the Bush Administration established the parameters for President Obama's decision on Iraq.  Additionally, President Bush's nomination and Senate approval of General David Petraeus as Commander of Central Command was a gift to the nation in terms of ensuring continued adult supervision and management of counterinsurgency efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Though President Obama could replace General Petraeus, removing America's most competent general would cost him.

For all the plan's merits, I do have a lingering concern in President Obama's withdrawal announcement.  His call for the end of combat operations in Iraq belies an important truth: all U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines on the ground, despite their task or mission, will still be in harm's way.  This is a fundamental reality the American public must understand.  Regardless of the euphemism used to describe the remaining force—be it the “911 Force”, Iraq Counterterrorism Task Force, etc.—it is important to recognize that American men and women in uniform may very well be involved in continued combat situations.  This small U.S. force will have to have teeth; simply leaving the lawyers, cooks, and administrative staff behind without the appropriate tools to defend themselves would be unwise. 

Meanwhile, fixing the other war—Afghanistan—will require no less brain power and significantly more time and effort.  Candidate Obama campaigned on winning in Afghanistan as the central theme of his fight against terror.  President Obama is about to learn the difference between such campaign talk and actually climbing into the octagon.  Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the assorted half-dozen other anti-coalition militant groups that operate in the Afghan/Pak theater obey none of the rules of war as defined in the Geneva Convention; yet they plead for the protection of these accords.  They kidnap, beat, rape and butcher any combatant or civilian that falls in their hands.  As Commander-in-Chief, President Obama now lives with the reality and responsibility for casualties incurred in this fight.

It will be critical that the President look to Republicans for support on Afghanistan.  Few in the camp that elected him will have the stomach for what lies ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Tribal Areas.  To date, technology and unmanned missile strikes have kept our enemies on the backs of their heels.  But the enemy will surely adjust and seek new asymmetrical methods of attack.  The numbers of suicide bombings in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan have doubled in the last year.  The elimination of moderate tribal elders will allow for an almost immediate redefinition of demographics and unforeseen radicalization of a population merely trying to survive.

On both sides of the Afghan/Pakistani border, counter-insurgency efforts must seek to return to basics.  This translates into the fundamental task of establishing the rule of law.  After U.S. and Afghan Army forces seize and reestablish control of a village or town, national policing forces must arrive in sufficient number to hold and root out extremist supporters and sympathizers.  Communities must then be armed and organized into larger networks to allow for their own collective defense as a means of resisting re-occupation by extremists.  Such efforts will take time.  They require boots on the ground and constant shared risks with those whom we seek to aid.  Maintaining support for this effort will require leadership and recognition that those we currently fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan have every intention of expanding their efforts against us into the broader world community.

The Politics of Counter-Terrorism

President Barack Obama’s recently signed Executive Orders, banning enhanced interrogation techniques and closing the Guantanamo (GITMO) prison facility, were met with applause from the political left and horror from the political right.  So continues the politics of counterterrorism.  President George W. Bush used the “Global War on Terror” for a measure of political gain.  And now President Obama, unrestrained and similarly guilty of making statements regarding his own goals on counterterrorism, has brazenly pandered to voters without explaining the true dangers that lie ahead. 

Enhanced interrogation techniques include sleep deprivation, alteration of diet, placement in stress positions and water boarding.  All of these techniques were employed by the George W. Bush administration on three specific members of Al Qaeda: September 11th mastermind, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad; his replacement as Al Qaeda Chief of Operations, Ramzi Bin Al Shibi; and Abd al-Rahim al Nashiri.   All men have admitted publicly that they are not only guilty of participating in the planning of catastrophic attacks (meaning mass murder) of U.S. citizens but are proud of their actions.  The decision made to employ enhanced techniques against these three individuals produced intelligence that allowed for the decapitation of Al Qaeda’s second tier.  Whether one agrees with President George W. Bush’s decision on this matter or not, it is important to understand that at the time of their capture, each of these men were working toward the goal of killing as many Americans as possible while Al Qaeda had simultaneously sought and obtained a fatwa (or religious ruling) from a cleric to employ a nuclear weapon against the United States.   

President Obama’s pledge to halt enhanced interrogation techniques was a central theme of his campaign.  The decision now limits both United States military forces and the CIA to the U.S. Army Military Field Manual.  This betrays the fact that the new President and those advising him either do not comprehend the reality of what is occurring in terms of military interrogations—or, more alarmingly, they have chosen not to understand.  The truth is that the manual’s instructions are utterly ineffective.  As an example, under the current U.S. Army Field Manual, you may ask a suspect once, and only once, if he or she has committed a violent act.  Asking a second time is considered badgering and is a violation.  Ironically, this means that though an American citizen in the U.S. can be questioned intensely, a terrorist captured on the battlefield—knee deep in the bodies of his victims—can only be asked a particular question once.  In order to come to terms with these types of incongruities, the White House urgently needs to send someone into the field.  Someone who can examine and thoroughly monitor the entire cycle: from combat to prisoner capture, from questioning to incarceration. 

President Obama’s campaign rhetoric and political ambition also outweighed any desire for a detailed and honest evaluation of what is being done with the prisoners held in Guantanamo.  I am not in favor of enhanced interrogation techniques as a routine practice.  However, should someone be found with WMD material or found to be a participant in an effort to conduct a catastrophic attack on the homeland, a President can not afford to wholly disarm himself of the option to employ such techniques.  To do so, in this age of technology and terror, would be an act of extreme folly.  It would expose our families to grave danger.  President Obama would be wise to consider President Abraham Lincoln’s rationale for abrogating Habeus Corpus during the Civil War.  Stated succinctly, Lincoln explained: “[t]he Constitution of the United States is not a suicide pact.”

The closure of GITMO and specifically the future of those housed in that facility is a subject that should concern all of us.  The Bush Administration failed to make tough decisions on the matter.  There are at least one hundred prisoners in GITMO that fit the category of Enemy Combatant.  According to the Geneva Convention, the United States can justifiably, and in accordance with international norms, execute these individuals as marauders.    President Bush’s failure to deal with the status of such killers in an expeditious fashion and his decision to simply pass them on to the Obama Administration was not helpful in the least.  Former Bush administration officials no longer deserve the right to even comment on the status of the detainees; they had their chance and sadly voted present.   For his part, President Obama needs to ensure that any transfer of GITMO prisoners into the custody of other nations is done so on the condition of predetermined sentencing guidelines.  Those that do remain in US custody need to face some form of judicial process. Without these sorts of substantive steps—and without policies based on honest and comprehensive evaluation—we fail to address the toughest and most important issues at hand.  Such is the politics of counterterrorism.

A Loyal Opposition

A realignment of political power has occurred in the United States.  It has been marked by the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States as well as an accompanying commanding majority of Democrats in both houses of Congress  The election of President Obama, like that of other presidents, resulted from excellent political organization, an incredible public relations campaign and the convergence of unique political circumstances.  One must give the new President and his team credit: they are effective campaigners and fundraisers.

Over the past few days, in the run up to Inauguration, there has been no shortage of comparisons made between Obama and great Americans such as Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Martin Luther King, Jr.  Should Obama distinguish himself like these remarkable individuals, the country will unquestionably be a better place.  However, it should be obvious that the accomplishments of Lincoln—saving the nation from civil war and issuing the Emancipation Proclamation—or FDR—leading the country out of the Great Depression and guiding the nation to victory in World War II—make such comparisons wildly foolish and premature.  By the same token, those who compare President Obama to Martin Luther King, Jr. fail to comprehend the incredible courage, vision, and faith that King displayed in his leading role during the Civil Rights Movement.  King faced down the most powerful country in the world in an effort to save it from itself.  As a consequence, he sacrificed his own life for the nation. In context, President Obama’s election is undoubtedly an important marker in American history.  He has provided hope to all citizens by demonstrating that anyone, regardless of race or class, can achieve the American dream.  But credit must be leveled in another important direction: to the nation, as a whole.  For President Obama’s election truly says more about America than it does simply about Obama himself.

Now much hard work lies before President Obama—as for elected officials of all stripes.  It will be particularly critical that Republicans find a voice and a role that suits the new political reality and the harsh economic times that face the nation.  As Republicans move forward in this new role, they must demonstrate and demand fiscal responsibility, competence in governance, and the ethical exercise of capitalism.  Support to corporate welfare and excesses in executive compensation from firms that are recipients of bailout money can not be tolerated.  Republicans must establish opposition to policies that work contrary to the public good, but they must do so with substance and principle not ugly partisan attacks.  It is the Republicans, now entirely in the minority, who can redefine the tone of our national political dialogue. In this time of financial crisis and war, we will need more than just hope in a new president.  We will need a loyal and committed opposition.

Obama and Iran: The Rise of the Revolutionary Guard Corps

With Israel fully engaged in an ongoing conflict to diminish both the military and political standing of Hamas, there is another, arguably more demanding, Middle East challenge that sits in waiting for President-Elect Barack Obama: the conflict between the United States and Iran.  Throughout the presidential campaign, Obama optimistically discussed his hope and vision for the establishment of a dialogue with Iran.  Never were the underpinnings for such a dialogue clearly defined.  Though Obama demonstrated no hesitancy in critiquing the Bush administration as having a failed policy on Iran, he never did explain how his own strategy will bridge the gaping disparities in worldview and national objectives that come between Iran and the United States. 

Consider the following realities.  Iran has stated definitively that it desires the destruction of the State of Israel, a key American ally.  Iran has pursued dominance of the Persian/Arabian Gulf, contrary to the wishes of neighboring Gulf States.  Iran is also the principle state sponsor of some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.  And as a signatory to the International Atomic Energy Commission, Iran promises not to develop nuclear weapons yet uses its membership to gain access to the technology that will ensure nuclear weapons development.  What makes this all possible is a combination of factors: gall on the part of the Islamic Iranian Regime; greed from technology providers acting in the interests of governments and private companies; and finally the utter cowardliness of the vast majority of nation states that would prefer to look the other away rather than confront Iran.  All of Iran’s activities invite terrible danger.  And though Iran’s support to terrorism threatens dangerous military reprisal, it is the country’s nuclear ambitions that truly risk igniting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and open up the possibility of a true catastrophe.

President Obama will find that Iran in 2009 is a more recalcitrant and difficult negotiating partner.  In recent days, Iran’s ultimate ruler, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has hardened Iranian positions throughout the country through his support of numerous former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij Commanders.  Eight such men are currently members of the Iranian Cabinet and a half a dozen others serve as provincial Governors. To appreciate the ramifications of this development, one must take a closer look at the IRGC.  Created at the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution to serve as a counter-balance to the Iranian Armed Forces, the IRGC swears an allegiance to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rather than to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (himself a former IRGC Officer).  The basis of IRGC ideology is a strict adherence to the defense of the Islamic nature of the Iranian regime and rejection of U.S. policies that aim to limit Iranian regional influence.  The hardliners of the IRGC have, like former KGB and GRU Officers in Russia, exponentially expanded their control over the instruments of power and wealth within their country.  The IRGC controls security for Iran’s nuclear program.  It manages construction contracts and an array of state industries.  It has even taken control of the Bonyad Mostafazin (Organization for the Oppressed), which was charged with managing all the wealth seized from the former Shah of Iran and his associates.

Despite a downturn in the world economy and steep reduction in the price of oil—which drives the Iranian economy—Iran’s true believers will be difficult to draw to the negotiating table and then almost impossible to deal with if and when they arrive.  Their overriding concern will remain the survival of the Islamic nature of the regime, not the establishment of a median income that compares to the West.  Iran views Israel’s attack on Gaza as yet another American-inspired assault on Islam and will likely only harden its commitment to the creation and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal as the ultimate guarantor of security.  The challenge for President Obama will be to move from fanciful campaign rhetoric to a substantive plan for the advancement of a US-Iranian dialogue—which will ultimately have to include Iranian hardliners who know only violence and ambition.

Leon Panetta - Obama's Man for CIA

President Elect Barak Obama’s selection of former Clinton White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, has surprised most people.  Though Panetta is universally respected for having devoted a major portion of his life to public service, he has no experience in the field of intelligence.  In my recently published book Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism and National Leadership, I made the argument for what was needed in a Director of Central Intelligence.  I recommended that a candidate for the position should have experience in making tactical, life-and-death decisions and that either a former Ambassador or senior military officer would be best suited and capable of bringing such skills to the job.   

In looking back, Panetta, as a White House Chief of Staff, would have clearly been at the heart of many significant policy decisions—or given his service in the Clinton White House, many indecisions.  The Clinton administration was anything but decisive when it came to confronting the growing threat of Al Qaeda during the mid to late 1990’s.   Mr. Panetta’s service during that period is likely to receive a significant level of scrutiny during his confirmation process.  

To his credit, the record shows that Panetta is one of the most capable and informed managers in Washington D.C.  But what we must know, more than anything, are his marching orders from a President Obama and his intentions regarding clandestine collection.  Will Panetta, like former Director John Deutch, enter CIA with the aim of gutting collection capability and reducing operational initiatives? Or will he seek to improve and expand capability?

I also find it very curious that Panetta, a former White House Chief of Staff, would not have been given the more senior of intelligence positions, i.e. Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  This position has been offered to Admiral Dennis Blair, who will effectively become Panetta’s boss.   

Finally, I have found that the less experienced a President is on matters of national security and intelligence, the more fearful he has been of CIA.   The selection of Leon Panetta, if nothing else, is likely to create a significant firewall between potential problems at CIA and a new Obama White House.  The ramifications of this will undoubtedly be critical to the future of U.S. intelligence capabilities.

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Click HERE to review Gary's discussion of the Panetta selection on FOX News (January 7, 2009).